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APR 23 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GEORGE A. MORGAN *lured*
Acting Director
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death
(PSB D-40), dated 20 March 1953

I have approved this draft of PSB D-40 subject to the changes recommended at the PSB staff meeting of 25 March 1953 and at the Working Group, Stalin, meetings to date. It is my understanding that the changes recommended at the PSB staff meeting provided that paragraph 3 of Part II (Overt Operations) be noted by the Board and referred to the Working Group, Stalin, as guidance. Details of the changes recommended to the Working Group are attached to this memorandum.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

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Attachment:

Proposed Changes

PP/PP/PL/TMF:blr 17 Apr 53

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APPENDIX

CHANGES PROPOSED BY WORKING GROUP, STALIN

1. Page 3, paragraph b. (1) - Delete last sentence:

"This development and the announced changes in governmental structure, indicate careful preparation and premeditation."

2. Page 4, paragraph (2), line 2 - Delete "almost identical" and substitute, "similar."

3. Page 4, paragraph (4) - Delete last sentence:

"However, the peoples of the Soviet Union are definitely not playing a major role in the situation."

4. Page 4 - Delete paragraph (5) and substitute:

(5) Although current "peace" moves suggest that the Kremlin is altering its conduct of foreign and domestic policies, there is nothing at the present time which indicates a fundamental change in the long-range objectives of the Soviet government.

5. Page 5 - Delete paragraph c. and substitute:

c. On the other hand, the very rapidity with which the transfer of power has been effected, the nature of this change, and measures taken by the Kremlin to obtain the good will of the people, together with the speed with which Stalin was interred and the warnings against "disorder and panic," suggest that nervousness and concern over the stability of the new regime are prevalent at the highest levels.

6. Page 5, paragraph d. - Substitute the following for second sentence through sub-paragraphs (1) and (2):

However, it is also in the nature of such a new regime that it must try to achieve the appearance of strength and permanence. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:

(1) The new regime is unlikely to undertake any actions that would lead to general war.

(2) While altering certain lines in the conduct of foreign and domestic policies the new rulers will probably adhere rigidly for the time being to the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin.

7. Page 6 - Delete all of paragraph "f."

8. Page 7, paragraph (3) - Delete "Malenkov" and substitute "the regime."
9. Page 7, paragraph (4) - Delete "Malenkov" and substitute "the Soviet regime."
10. Page 8 - Delete all of paragraph "c."
11. Page 7 - Add the following aims:
 - (9) To resist and unmask vigorously any new false peace campaign.
 - (10) To combat wishful thinking of the free world as to the weakness of Communism.
 - (11) To react resolutely to any new aggression.
12. Page 9 - Delete last paragraph (b) and substitute:
 - (b) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to the absence of any outstanding figure of stature, experience and ideological prowess as the new leader of world communism."
13. Page 10 - Delete paragraph f. and substitute the following:
 - f. Phases.
 - (1) Initial Period. During the next few weeks, much expenditure is justified in order to prolong and exploit the condition of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. The Presidential speech is assumed above, specially for this reason.
 - (2) Subsequent Phases. It is most important that initial action be followed by a series of integrated steps. Above all, operations should be prepared to make the Kremlin assume maximum liability if it does not accept the proposals in the Presidential speech. Measures should be taken to germinate the seeds of disunity and to probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system. If events develop very favorably, these steps could culminate in a
 - (3) Glimax in which the communist system would break into open internal conflict. This culminating phase in our strategy should begin if and when such conflict seems near. If it never comes, the strategy should still have contributed usefully to our basic purpose.

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